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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
For an indorser to be liable on a check, presentment must first be made
on the drawee bank within a reasonable time. Then, if the bank refuses to
pay, notice of dishonor must be given to the indorser before midnight of the
third business day after the indorsee receives notice of dishonor from the
drawee bank, under Section 3-508. As the court correctly noted, in the case
of uncertified checks drawn and payable in the United States there is a
presumption that, if presentment or the initiation of bank collection is made
within seven days after indorsement, it is made within a reasonable time.
In the present case there is no evidence that timely presentment was not
made on the drawee bank. What the plaintiffs failed to prove was that timely
notice of dishonor was given to the indorsee, or that tardy notice was excus-
able. Thus, under Section 3-502(1)(a), the indorser Robinson was discharged.
However, as the court goes on to point out, even if timely notice of dishonor
were given, the plaintiffs could not prevail since they were neither holders
nor owners of lost, destroyed or stolen checks.
H.S.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-104. Definitions and Index of Definitions
MALPHRUS V. HOME SAV. BANK
254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 4-403, infra.
SECTION 4-109. Process of Posting
GIBBS V. GERBERICH
1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964)
Annotated under Section 4-303, infra.
SECTION 4-208. Security Interest of Collecting Bank
in Items, Accompanying Documents
and Proceeds
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
Annotated under Section 4-209, infra.
SECTION 4-209. When Bank Gives Value for Purposes of
Holder in Due Course
CITIZENS BANK V. NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE
334 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1964)
The plaintiff, an Arkansas bank, held a past due note executed by one of
its customers. The customer attempted to satisfy the note with a large check
payable to him, drawn on an Oklahoma bank. Before cashing the check and
discharging the note the plaintiff bank telephoned the Oklahoma bank and
asked one of its officers whether the drawer of the check had sufficient funds
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in his account to cover the check. The Oklahoma bank said that he did but
indicated that he might not if the check were presented through conventional
channels. On this information the plaintiff bank accepted the check in dis-
charge of the customer's note, and on the same day one of its officers drove
150 miles to the Oklahoma bank to present it. When he arrived, he was asked
to indorse the check on behalf of his bank, which he did. The Oklahoma bank
then accepted the check and gave the plaintiff baink a cashier's check in
return. Later that day, the Oklahoma bank discovered that the check pre-
sented to it was a forgery and immediately notified the plaintiff bank. Later,
when the Oklahoma bank refused to honor its cashier's check, the plaintiff
bank sued on the instrument. The lower court gave judgment to the de-
fendant. On appeal, reversed.
The court first determined that Oklahoma law, applied. Under the law
of that state an indorser who was a holder in due course did not warrant to
the drawee bank the genuineness of the drawer's signature. Thus, if the plain-
tiff were a holder in due course, the defendant bank could not legitimately
resist collection of its cashier's check. Under Oklahoma conflict of laws rules,
the question of whether the plaintiff bank was a holder in due course de-
pended on Arkansas law. There, the Uniform Commercial Code was in effect,
and under it [Section 3-302J, the plaintiff was found to be a holder in due
course. First, despite the fact that the customer was a bad credit risk against
whom the plaintiff had been forced in other matters to take legal action, the
bank did not have "notice" of the check's infirmity. Section 1-201(25).
Second, by acting honestly throughout, the plaintiff bank had acted "in good
faith." Section 1-201(19). And third, the plaintiff had given "value" for
the forged check. On this last point, the defendant disagreed, arguing
that the Arkansas bank, presumptively a collecting agent, had only provision-
ally settled with its customer under Section 4-201 and had not, therefore,
given value. Furthermore, after acknowledging that the plaintiff bank could
take in settlement of the forged check a cashier's check under Section
4-211(1) (h), the defendant argued that if the cashier's check were dis-
honored, the plaintiff bank had a right of chargeback under Section 4-212
and, having this right of chargeback against its customer, it could not en-
force payment of the cashier's check.
The court rejected these arguments, holding that under Article 4 the
Arkansas bank could be a holder in due course while acting as collection
agent for its customer. Whether it had given value 1
 or not depended on
whether it had a security interest in the check, under Sedtion 4-209. And under
Section 4-208(b), the bank had a security interest in the check to the extent
of the credit it had provisionally extended to its customer. In discharging
the customer's debt, the plaintiff had given credit. In an analogous situation
where collecting banks are not involved, if a negotiated instrument is taken
in satisfaction of an antecedent debt, the taker gives value under Section
3-303.
The plaintiff was thus a holder in due course under Arkansas Iaw, and
entitled to recover under Oklahoma law.
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COMMENT
Under the prevailing Oklahoma law, so long as the Arkansas bank was a
holder in due course, it made no warranty to the drawee bank that the
drawer's signature was authorized. This is the common law rule of Price v.
Neal. If the Code were controlling in Oklahoma, however, the Arkansas bank
would not have been required to establish that it was a holder in due course.
Whether it was or was not, it would make no warranty to the drawee bank
that the customer's signature was authorized. Section 4-207(1)(b). It is
important to note, however, that under any circumstances it would warrant
that it had no knowledge that the drawer's signature was unauthorized.
S.L.P.
SECTION 4-303. When Item Subject to Notice, Stop-Order,
Legal Process or Setoff; Order in Which
Items May be Charged or Certified
GIBBS V. GERBERICH
1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964)
Gerberich, a realtor, placed the proceeds he received from the sale of
Hewitt's property into his own escrow account. He then drew Hewitt a check
on that account, which was received for payment by the drawee bank on
July 19, 1962. On the day the check was received, but after it had been
mechanically charged against Gerberich's account by a posting machine, a
restraining order was served on the bank, prohibiting it from paying money
out of the escrow account. The money was thereupon recredited to the ac-
count. The issue, as the court saw it, was whether the check had been paid
before the bank had notice of the restraining order. This depended on
whether the "process of posting" had been completed. If the process of
posting was completed before the restraining order arrived, the item was
finally paid to Hewitt under Section 4-213 (Section 1304.19, Ohio Rev.
Code). But if the process of posting was not completed when the order
arrived, then, under Section 4-303 (1034.23), the bank's duty to pay the
check to Hewitt was terminated. Section 4-109 defined process of posting
but that section was not incorporated into the Ohio Code. The court there-
fore looked to non-Code law where it found that the process of posting in-
volved two basic steps: (1) a decision by the bank to pay, and (2) a record-
ing of that payment. Whether these steps had been taken was largely a
matter of the bank's chosen procedures. In the present case the bank had
recorded the payment but there was no evidence indicating a final decision
to pay. The debiting of Gerberich's account was not conclusive. According
to the testimony given at trial, the bank did not consider the machine posting
as evidencing its final decision to pay since overdrawn checks would still
have to be recredited and properly posted checks cancelled. Moreover, the
day's posting was not found to be in balance prior to the receipt of the
restraining order, and the check had not been voided or cancelled. Accord-
ingly, the court held that the process of posting was not completed when the
790
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
restraining order arrived, and that the funds in question should be turned
over to Gerberich's receiver.
COMMENT
1. Section 4-303 states five conditions the happening of any one of
which prevents a restraining order or other legal process from being effective
as to an individual item. One of these conditioni, as the court correctly
stated, is the completion of the posting process. The other four occur when
the bank (a) accepts or certifies the item; (b) pays the item in cash; (c)
settles for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and
without having such right under statute, clearing house rule or agreement;
and (d) becomes accountable for the amount of the item under subsection
(1)(d) of Section 4-213 and Section 4-302 dealing with the payor bank's
responsibility for late return of items.
2. Section 4-109, added to the Official Code in 1962, defines "process
of posting" in a flexible way.
The "process of posting" means the usual procedure followed by a
payor bank in determining to pay an item and in recording the pay-
ment including one or more of the following, or other steps as
determined by the bank:
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing a "paid" or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous action with
respect to the item. [Emphasis added.]
Of overriding importance, as the italicized words show, is the bank's own
view of whether it has completed the process of posting. Though the court
could not rely on the guidelines set out in Section 4-109 since the legislature
had not yet incorporated it into the Ohio Revised Code, it came up with
substantially the same set of controlling factors, including the bank's own
view of when the process of posting was completed, whether the check had
been cancelled, whether a charge had been made to the customer's
account, etc.
R.W.D.
SECTION 4-403. Customer's Right to Stop Payment;
Burden of Proof of Loss
MALPHRUS V. HOME SAV. BANK
254 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Albany County Ct. 1965)
A depositor in the defendant savings bank requested the bank to issue a
teller's check payable to the order of the plaintiff and to deduct the amount of
the check from her account. The depositor then delivered the check to the
plaintiff in part payment for an automobile. When the check was presented
at the bank upon which the defendant-bank had drawn it, it was dishonored
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on the ground that the defendant had stopped payment. The plaintiff brought
an action to recover the amount of the check and moved for summary judg-
ment. In granting the motion, the court acknowledged that under Section
4-403(1) a customer may stop payment and that under Section 4-104(1)(e)
a "customer" includes "a bank carrying an account with another bank."
However, in this case the defendant could not stop payment because it "had
no stake in the transaction whatsoever." The purpose in permitting payment
to be stopped is to protect either an actual party to an underlying trans-
action (the depositor) or the bank on which the check is drawn. The de-
fendant fell within neither class. Moreover, Section 3-802(1)(a) supported
the holding. Under that section, the depositor's underlying obligation to
the plaintiff was pro tanto discharged when the plaintiff took in satisfaction
of that obligation a check drawn by a bank which did not contain a right
of recourse against the underlying obligor. Consequently, if the defendant-
bank were not liable, the plaintiff would have no enforceable rights under
the Code. Such a result could not be tolerated since the Code was enacted
to protect persons engaged in business transactions involving instruments for
the payment of money.
COMMENT
The opinion does not state the reason why the bank stopped payment;
however, it is reasonable to assume that it did so on instruction from its
depositor, the car buyer. In this respect it should be noted that under Sec-
tion 3-306(d) the bank could not, as a general rule, have successfully inter-
posed a defense or claim belonging to its depositor. The only defenses belong-
ing to its depositor which it could have interposed are (1) that the check
was stolen, or (2) that payment or satisfaction would be inconsistent with
a restrictive indorsement.
R.G.K
ARTICLE 7: DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
SECTION 7-203. Liability for Non-Receipt or Misdescription
NATIONAL DAIRY PRODS. CORP. V. LAWRENCE AM. FIELD WAREHOUSING
CORP.
255 N.Y.S.2d 788 (App. Div. 1965)
The defendant (hereinafter Field) was a field warehouseman for Allied
Crude Oil Refining Company. The plaintiffs are holders of non-negotiable
warehouse receipts issued to them or their predecessors in interest by the
defendant in conjunction with the deposit of large quantities of soybean oil.
Four of the plaintiffs are holders of diverse security interests in the oil; the
remaining two are direct shippers of the oil. Subsequent to the issuance of
the receipts the defendant transferred its assets, including the oil, to a sec-
ond bailee. The receipts were dishonored after this transfer when it was
discovered that the oil had mysteriously disappeared. No explanation has
been offered by either party of the loss of the oil.
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